



## On Culture and Regional Integration

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# On Culture and Regional Integration<sup>1</sup>

Søren Dosenrode

“Culture is more often a source of conflict than of synergy.  
Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster.”

Geert Hofstede, Emeritus Professor, Maastricht University.

## Argument for the topic of the essay

The rationale behind writing this working paper on the relation ‘culture - regional integration’ is that regional integration is increasingly popular, also outside Europe (e.g. the African Union, Mercosur, the processes in South East Asia). Thus it is important *per se* to understand it, as a feature in the relations among states. Culture itself, as an element in social science analysis, was ‘in’ in the 1940 and 1950s and then ‘out’ until the beginning of the 1990s. This working paper aims at looking at a still rather unnoticed relation namely that of cultural familiarity as a possible condition for successful regional integration in a tentative way. It does so by discussing the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘regional integration’, to establish a preliminary frame of reference. It is followed by an overview of (some) approaches to the integration process with a special emphasis on their in- or exclusion of ‘culture’. And then follows an attempt to set up a working hypothesis and to confront it – very sketchy – with some regional integration projects. The working hypothesis is, that shared core and manifest cultures are important for the success of regional integration project, especially if they aim at constructing state-like entities. But basically this paper gives an overview more than an empirically based analysis. The latter will come later.

## A Few Core Concepts

### *Culture*

After decades in the darkness, culture has been *en vogue* within the social sciences since the beginning of the 1990s. Perhaps that is no coincidence. During the Cold War the World was divided in a few blocks and interest spheres, which did not leave much room for variation within the individual

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is an elaborated version of a contribution, ‘Is a Common Culture a Prerequisite for Regional Integration? - An attempt to construct a frame of analysis’, presented at the workshop ‘Brudlinjer i Europa? Kultur Integration & Politik’ Aalborg University, April 27th, 2006. The project is still very much ‘in progress’.

blocks. After the Soviet Union's falling apart, and the US standing as the only superpower, culture diversity has had better changes than before; for better or worse.

But what is culture and does it actually matter? To start out Geert Hofstede makes a very simple but useful distinction concerning culture, when dividing it in 'Culture one' and 'Culture two' (1991/16). 'Culture one' is culture in the classical meaning of the word, that is education, refinement, art etc. 'Culture two' includes the activities in 'Culture one' but is broader – very much broader – , including every days work and routines like to great, to eat, to love etc. Culture in this essay is concerned mainly with 'Culture two', but that needs further elaboration. Hofstede continues:

“Culture could be defined as the interactive aggregate of common characteristics that influence a human group's response to its environment. Culture determines the identity of a human group in the same way as personality determines the identity of an individual.” (1980 (1984) / 21).

Hans Gullestrup has made a more cumulative definition of culture with the aim of analysing and understanding cultures, across cultures (2003/55, my translation):

“Culture is the worldview and the values, rules, moral norms and actual conduct – as well as the material and immaterial products and symbols related thereto - as human beings (in a given context and over a given time span) take over from the previous 'generation'; which they – eventually in a changed form) try to pass over to the next 'generation' and which in one or the other form differentiates them from human beings belonging to another culture.”

Another definition, less elaborated, comes from Samuel Huntington, who begins by warning us, in his 2000 (p. xv) book, that “[...] if culture includes everything, it explains nothing”, before he goes on defining culture in subjective terms as (2000/ xv): “[...] the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society”, a definition Landes (2000/2) and Porter (2000/15) also use. Brian M. Fagan writes: “A culture is a complex system, a set of interacting variables – tools, burial customs, ways of getting food, religious beliefs, social organisation, and so on – that function to maintain a community in a state of equilibrium with its environment” (cited in Gullestrup 2003/45). Fagan's definition trespasses that of Gullestrup and Huntington in so far as it insist on the normative function of keeping a culture in equilibrium with its environment.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> I would consider that a highly questionable claim; the relativistic note it has got allows for the existence of both KZ- and Gulag-camps without questioning such 'phenomena'.


Returning to Hofstede, Gullestrup and Huntington, they all include more than one level in their analysis of cultures. Hofstede in his famous 'onion' model (a core (the values), followed by rituals, heroes and as the outer layer, symbols (1991/19)). Huntington includes layers or levels already in the definition, and Gullestrup in his elaborated frame of analysis. They all agree that there is an 'upper' more or less visible or manifest layer, as well as a 'deeper', core culture.<sup>3</sup>

Gullestrup and Huntington have different aims with their respective works; Huntington's book is (1997/13): "[...] meant to be an interpretation of the evolution of global politics after the Cold War. It aspires to present a framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics that will be meaningful to scholars and useful to policymakers". Thus his aim is very specific, conducted at the macro level, and very practical oriented, one may say, very Anglo-Saxon. Gullestrup's ambition is different. His aim is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the cultural likenesses and differences of human beings, and that may make it easier to work in intercultural relations (2003/14). For this purpose Gullestrup builds a theoretical approach to analyse cultures. Thus his aim is of a general, theoretical nature, one may say, belonging to a continental scientific tradition. Due to this 'higher' purpose I have chosen Gullestrup's approach as theoretical basis for this essay.

Gullestrup (2003/77-98) has constructed a model consisting of two levels, the basic, 'core-culture' and the 'manifest culture'; thus society's culture has a fairly abstract basis which is getting more and more concrete as one passes through the layers. The fundament of the core-culture is the 'fundamental world-view' (e.g. nature of man as described in the Bible or the Koran), followed by the 'fundamental values' (e.g. social responsibility), and the 'not perceivable present' (e.g. criteria of solidarity). This basic level is followed by the manifest level consisting of: the formalised moral- and rules layer (e.g. practical rules for how to behave); the difficultly perceivable structural layer (e.g. social- and economic structures, administrative processes) and the 'immediately sensible layer' (e.g. language, songs, law, rules).


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<sup>3</sup> I will leave out Hofstede and his country map model in this analysis i.e. because he, as a typical secularised north western European, underestimates the role of religion (1991/27), which at least after '9.11.' is not longer possible. For further criticism of Hofstede see Baca et al. 1999.



(Figure 1: Hans Gullestrup's culture model)

Gullestrup's model has the advantage of identifying the fundament of a culture, and leaving space for a certain dynamism. It also shows that two different core-cultures may share common features of the manifest culture, although coming from different positions like e.g. democracy, and thus also explain why there may be different understandings of the 'same' feature.



(Figure 2)

But first one question has to be answered, does culture matter? Looking back at the place of culture in social sciences, the answer in the 70s and 80s would have been negative. But as already mentioned has culture as important variable had its comeback since the 1990s<sup>4</sup>. In his contribution to an anthology on economic development and democracy (Huntington and Harrison 2000) David Lands answers the question affirmative (p. 2): "If we can learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes almost all the

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Francis Fukuyama (The Great Disruption, Free Press, New York, 1999), Lawrence Harrison (Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind, University Press of America, Cambridge, 1985) and Robert Putnam (Making Democracy Work, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1993)

difference” but also “On the other hand, culture does not stand alone.” Ronald Inglehart forcefully argues the same case (2000/80): “Distinctive cultural zones exist and they have major social and political consequences, helping shape important phenomena from fertility rates to economic and [...] democratic institutions”. And Huntington argued in 1997: “In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economical. They are cultural. [...] People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and at the broadest level, civilizations.”<sup>5</sup>

Thus there seem to be an argument for looking at the relation culture – regional integration (in the following RI or integration), especially as it – to min knowledge – is fairly underrated. The next step is to define ‘integration’.

### **Regional Integration**

‘Regional integration’ includes two concepts ‘regional’ and ‘integration’; we will look at them both, with an emphasis on the latter.

First of all the question arises, does one think of a sub-national region like a Danish or British county or does one think of supra-national regions, something larger than a state? In this context we look at supra-national regions. The concept ‘supranational-region’ is ambivalent, and hard to operationalize as one sees it, in e.g. Buzan 1991(chapter 5). Michael Haas’ basic definition is: “any subset of the international system” (1970), but this is much too broad. As outset I use Thompson’s classical definition from 1973 as it, to my mind includes the essence of the concept ‘region’ as well as being operational: “[the] necessary and sufficient conditions for a regional subsystem [I consider a region = a regional subsystem, SD] includes: regularity and intensity of interactions so that a change in one part affects other parts; general proximity of actors; internal and external recognition of the subsystem as distinctive; and provisions of at least two, and probably more, actors in the subsystem”. This includes geographical space as well as some kind of contiguity. I will leave it at this, for the time being.

The choice of the definition of ‘integration’ stands between a broad and a narrow definition. A broad definition would be to understand integration as the process leading to the establishment as well as the working of regimes<sup>6</sup>, which

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<sup>5</sup> Richard Shweder is very critical towards the emphasise on cultures importance (2000)

<sup>6</sup> The term ‘regime’ may sound a bit outdated after Keohane has down-graded it to a sub-category of international institutions. But I find Stephan Krasner's definition useful, as it is



eventually may turn into states. It would be ‘overstretching’ the regime definition if one claimed that a state was a regime (and vice-versa). But a regime may be the beginning of a state formation. Krasner’s famous definition of regimes is still very usable:

“[...] Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.

This definition, and the addition of regimes as *starting point* of states, neither excludes the ambitious goal of establishing a federation, nor the less ambitious goal of a free trade area. Thus it is acknowledged that integration may have economic as well as political aspects.

Karl W. Deutsch’s understanding of integration is comparably narrow. He defines it as “[...] a relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack.” (1968/159). If the aim is to construct a supranational unit, the aim must consist of four elements (1968/192): “[...] 1) maintaining peace, 2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities, 3) accomplishing some specific tasks, and 4) gaining a new self-image and role identity.

Both of these definitions and their corollary contains a more or less explicitly stated cultural element, compared to most other definitions as e.g. William Wallace’s “the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously autonomous units” (1999 / 9). Walter Mattli defines integration as [...] the process of internalising externalities that cross borders within a group of countries” (1999 / 190). This definition assumes that integration begins, when important groups, primarily economical, face problems in the cross-border transfer of e.g. goods and services. Thus it implicitly sees integration as an economic process, although not ruling out political courses completely. The definition allows for *regional* regimes of both economic (e.g. EFTA, ECSC) and political character (e.g. WEU, Council of Europe).

As the aim of this essay is to analyse the role of culture in integration processes, I will opt for Deutsch’s definition and its corollary, focussing explicitly at ambitious integration projects aiming at close cooperation or even state-formation.<sup>7</sup>

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broad and avoids the connotations often linked to the term ‘institutions’ as being the same as an organisation. For a discussion of regime-theory, see Dosenrode 1992 pp 31-49.

<sup>7</sup> In this paper I consider the state the highest form of cooperation, the most encompassing and committed.

## Preconditions for integration and the role of culture in integration theories<sup>8</sup>

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Integration does not ‘just start’ spontaneously, most scholars agree about that, but there are divergences about the preconditions for regional integration. In this section three approaches to integration will be analysed.

### *Federalism*

According to the federal-realist approach two conditions must be met if a federation (which is the result of an integration process) should to be founded, (Riker 1964 / 12 f):

“1. A desire on the part of the politicians who offer the bargain in order to expand their territorial control by peaceful means, either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for diplomatic aggrandizement. [...]

2. The politicians who accept the bargain, giving up some independence for the sake of union, are willing to do so, because of some external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity.[...]. And furthermore the desire for either protection or participation outweighs any desire they may have for independence. [...].”

Later did Riker accept the comment of A. H. Birch, who insisted, that the perceived threat also could be caused by factors inside the state (Riker 1975 / 114). In the same vain, one may add, that there is nothing in Riker's model suggesting, that one cannot expand the threat to a broader field than the military and diplomatic fields. The main concern must be that the threat is serious. In such a case the threat could also be of economic, social or political nature (McKay 1999 / 29 & 32). The important point in the political consideration is that the statesman *believes* that the threat he *perceives* can be countered by joining or founding a federation. And also implies that a unitary state may be turned into a federation, to save it from total disintegration, as was the case of

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<sup>8</sup> This section mainly focuses on the integration theories / approaches which see a state formation of some kind as the end of the integration process, thus e.g. functionalism and intergovernmentalism is not included.

<sup>9</sup> Constructivism: The starting-point of constructivism is that social interaction is the process that reproduces structures. Thus constructivists oppose the rationalism which is the basis for mainstream international relation theory including the traditional regional integration theories (Rosamond 2000/172). (Social) constructivism has not tried to construct a comprehensive theory of regional integration. Instead the constructivist approaches have contributed to the understanding of e.g. collective identity formation and socialization processes (Risse 2006). Thus the constructivist approaches has been left out here.

Belgium in the 1990s and for several former British colonies. Federalisation has been a device to handle cultural diversity threatening, 'unity in diversity'. But the federations analysed by Riker all had a common core culture what *may* explain that he did not look at culture explicitly (and that is the same case for McKay only looking at the EU).

K. C. Wheare (1963) is a representative of the federal-liberal tradition, and he lists a number of conditions for integration (1963/35 pp):

1. "To begin with, the communities or states concerned must desire to be under a single independent government for some purpose at any rate" [...]
2. "They must desire at the same time to retain or to establish independent regional governments in some matters at least." [...] "They must desire to be united, but not to be unitary" [...]
3. "Federal government is not appropriate unless the communities concerned have the capacity as well as the desire to form an independent general government and to form independent regional governments."

Wheare then lists a number of preconditions to answer the question what leads states to desire integration, that is federation, and at the same time want to keep a certain independence including regional governments (1963/37):

"Communities [nation states / SD] have been led to desire union from a variety of reasons. But in the modern federation some factors seem always to have been present

- A sense of military insecurity and the consequent need for common defence.
- A desire to be independent of foreign powers, and a realization that only through union could independence be secured.
- A hope of economic advantage from union.
- Some political association of the community concerned prior to their federal union either in a loose confederation [...] or as parts of the same Empire, [...].
- Geographical neighbourhood,
- And similarity of political institutions."

Concerning culture Wheare is 'woolly'; on the one hand, he states, that (1963/38): "It is interesting to notice that some factors are unexpectedly absent. Thus community of language, of race, of religion, of nationality have not been listed as likely essential prerequisites of the desire for union", and (p. 39). "It is clear that, strong as these forces of language, race, religion and nationality are in producing a desire for union [...] it has proven possible none the less to produce

a desire for union among peoples who differ in all these important particulars”.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand he later mentions divergence of nationality, differences of language, race and religion (1963/ 41) as factors running contrary to integration, and in the above list of preconditions he lists ‘similarity of political institutions’.

Thus the federal traditions seem to share an agreement on the quest for security and independence, in a broad sense as important conditions for integration, whereas the cultural variable may play some kind of undefined but not essential role. The reason *could be* conceptual, a lack of definition of ‘culture’, as especially Wheare includes elements of ‘our’ definition but in a rather unsystematic fashion.

### *Neo-Functionalism*

If any, the neo-functionalist approach has been synonymous with the European integration process. This close link has been its strength in the formative years of the EC, and its weakness since the mid 1960s. The founding father of the approach was Ernst Haas, who wrote his seminal work ‘The Uniting of Europe’ from 1958, and who continued to publish important contributions the next decade and a half. Other important contributions came from Leon Lindberg (1963), and Philippe Schmitter (1969, 1971). Haas starting-point was a criticism of David Mitrany’s functionalism from the 1940s. He combined functionalism with inspiration from Jean Monnet’s pragmatic approach to European integration. Contrary to the functionalists, Haas and his followers looked at regional integration, not universal, and they understood the integration process as political, not merely functional or technocratic.

Haas’ original background conditions for regional integration were that the entities should pose pluralistic social structures, be substantially economic & industrial developed, and there should be a common ideological patterns among participating units. In other words Haas’ approach was limited to explaining integration in pluralistic democracies. But one has to remember, that integration has taken place, on a voluntary basis, among others in the North German Tax-Union and the United Dutch Provinces, too.

In his cooperation with Philippe Schmitter, Haas tried to loosen the close binding to the European integration-project and give neo-functionalism a general applicability (1964). Their result was a model with background conditions (size of unit, rate of transactions, degree of pluralism, elite complementarity); conditions at the time of economic union (governmental purpose, powers and functions of the new institutions), and the process

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<sup>10</sup> The reason for this mistake could be that Whearer considers the protestant and catholic denominations as ‘different’ religions, whereas they in fact share the same core culture (cf. Dosenrode 1998).

conditions (style of decision making, growth rate of transactions, actors adaptability). Thus cultural considerations are part of their framework especially in the concepts of ‘pluralism’ and ‘style of decision making’. Culture also plays a part in their analysis of possibilities of Latin American unity (1964 pages 726, 732, 733), but as a lesser important factor.

A central concept was ‘spill-over’, the claim, that agreement on integration in one economic area would or could over time course other economic policy-areas to integrate, too, in order to secure the full benefit of the integration in the first policy-area. Over time, the integration would turn political. But, according to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991/5) Haas, recognised, that a political kick in the right direction might be necessary, and that a high authority, looking after the integration projects common interest – not the individual member states – would be needed. The motives, the driving forces would be the pursuit of the politicians’ interests.

The transfer of loyalty towards the new ‘unit’ was another key-question. Indeed Haas defined integration as (quoted by Rosamond in Brözel 2006/25):

“Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The result is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”

French president de Gaulle’s partly successful attempt to ‘renationalise’ the EC, put a stop to the hypothesis of a semi-automatic spill-over, and neo-functionalism was criticised severely. But the criticisms lead to refinement of the approach (e.g. Joseph Nye1971).

Schmitter sums Haas’ approach up in the following way (2005/257):

“He [Haas; SD] hypothesized that, with the help of an active and resourceful secretariat and support from the organized interests affected by such externalities, national governments might (fitfully) learn and (reluctantly) agree to change their original positions. According to this approach, integration is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process, but one in which, under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressure and end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and developing more authority to the regional organizations they have created. Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting more and more of their expectations to the region and satisfying them will increase the likelihood that economic-social integration will ‘spill-over’ into political integration”.

The spill-over could happen if certain changes occurred (again Schmitter: 2005/258):

- increased interdependence between member-states
- a crisis of a certain size
- development of a powerful regional bureaucracy
- development of independent, regional interest organisations capable of acting in the region

Apart from Schmitter's earlier works his article from 2005 is very fruitful. In this article he reviews neo-functionalism as well as some of its critics. He argues that neo-functionalism was given up, too soon, and that it offers good explanations to the European integration-process during the 1980s and 1990s. But he also recognises shortcomings and emphasises which were put wrong (2005/ 261-62).

Haas and Schmitter did mainly worked with European integration and the EC / EU has for some decades had a very high degree of integration, where as e.g. EFTA did not posses that. Schmitter's interpretation of neo-functionalisms most distinctive maxims is paradigmatic, and it is a central contributor from the 'new generation' of neofunctionalists (2005 / 258 – 260):<sup>11</sup>

1. "*States* are not exclusive and may no longer be the predominant actors in the regional/international system"
2. "*Interests*, rather than common ideals or identity, are the driving force behind the integration process," [ but actors may learn and develop common ideals and identities]
3. "Decisions about integration are normally taken with very imperfect knowledge of their consequences and frequently under the pressure of deadlines or impending crisis"
4. "*Functions or issue areas* provide the usual foci for the integration process (at least in Western Europe), beginning with those that are initially considered the least controversial and, hence, easiest to deal with."
5. "Since *actors* in the integration process cannot be confined to existing national states or their interest groups and social movements [...], a theory of it should explicitly include a role for supranational persons, secretariats, and associations whose careers, resources and expectations become increasingly dependent upon the further expansion of integrative tasks".
6. "[Actors ] *Strategies* with regard to integration are convergent, not identical"

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<sup>11</sup> This list is a resume of Schmitter's list leaving out details. Schmitter himself draws on Haas 1964 and 1958.

7. “*Outcomes* of international integration are neither fixed in advance by the founding treaty, nor are they likely to be expressed exclusively through subsequent formal agreements”

One cannot help getting the impression, that Schmitter is moving towards a more realist interpretation of integration, in the same way as neo-realism and liberalism are getting closer.

Schmitter analyses the strengths and weaknesses of neo-functionalism, and lists 6 points (2005/266-67):

- “There were, indeed, underlying interdependencies that may have taken some time to mature, but they did serve to compel actors into reaching agreements that were not initially intended. [...] It is less clear, however, that the roles assigned to Eurocrats in the EC/EU secretariat and to the Euro-associations headquarters in Brussels in this process were so significant in this process of task expansion”<sup>12</sup>
- The growth in EC / EU activities meet has raised the frequency of meetings between the national representatives as well as between the national representatives and the EU civil servants. “This seems to have induced important learning effects [...] and even to have resulted in shifts in conceptions of national interests which may have been more important than the upward shift to regional interest politics predicted by neofunctionalists.”
- “[...], the policy expansion [...] has made it not only easier but even imperative to reach complex ‘log-rolls’ and ‘package-deals’ sufficient to extend further Community *compétences* and to buy out even the most recalcitrant of opponents. The process may even have crossed ‘the threshold of irreversibility’ [...]”
- “[...] much of what has happened since the mid-1970s can better be attributed to external trends and shocks than to purely internal processes and functional *engrenage*.” [The capacity of the European nation states, to control external economic trends fell], but it is doubtful that this would have had such an impact [on the integration process] were it not for the generalized perception that Europe as a whole was declining relatively to other competing regions of the world.”
- “In their singular concentration interdependencies rooted in production and exchange and, hence, the roles played by representatives of classes and sectors, the neofunctionalists tended to overlook very significant extensions of scope and, especially, the level of Community authority that

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<sup>12</sup> Could be right, but the European Roundtable of Industrials as well as Jacques Delors were important actors when launching the ESA. The later developments may be more doubtful.

were going on right under their noses – namely, as a result of the deliberations and decisions of the European Court of Justice.”

- “Finally, neofunctionalists failed to recognize (or, at least, to ‘problematize’) the significance of the enlargement of the EEC / EC to include new members”

In other words, Schmitter recognises the importance of the national politicians as well as the environment, thus accommodation to frequent raise criticism. But is culture a variable here? Could it be that Schmitter, like Haas, implicitly only looks at integration in ‘cultural homogenous regions’? Neither Haas nor Schmitter uses the concept explicitly, but cultural elements occur e.g. in Haas original model as background variables (pluralist social structures, common ideological patterns, important elements which are included in the Haas-Schmitter model). But the concept is not developed *an sich*. On the other hand, Schmitter considers ‘common ideals and identity’ as the result of integration, not a course for it. Thus the role of culture is unclear and ambivalent.

### *Transactionalism*

Karl W. Deutsch’s (1912 – 1992) name is close of synonymous with ‘transactionalism’ as approach to integration as he was the leader of its main project leading to the contribution ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area’ from 1957.

As already mentioned does he isolate four main tasks of integration (1968/1992): “[...] 1) maintaining peace, 2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities, 3) accomplishing some specific tasks, and 4) gaining a new self-image and role identity”.

These tasks are then, in the best behaviouristic tradition spelled out (cf. Deutsch 1968/1992). Peace is – quantitatively – measured by the absence of war as well as the lack of preparation of such. Multipurpose capabilities are indicated by the total GNP, its per capita GNP and the variety of undertakings. Specific tasks can be found by identifying common institutions, functions, resources etc., and a common role identity will be indicated by the use of common symbols, the creation of new ones, by the support and behaviour of elite and mass (1968/1992): “including popular acceptance of unrequited transfers of wealth or other benefits within the community, and of some degree of sharing benefits and burdens within it”

Then Deutsch goes on listing the background conditions for a successful integration process (1968 / 1992 p.): “The conditions of integration can again be stated under four headings: (1) mutual relevance of the units to one another; (2) compatibility of values and some actual joint rewards; (3) mutual



responsiveness; and (4) some degree of generalized common identity or loyalty.”

Whereas conditions 1 to 3 are fairly clear and *grosso modo* in accordance with e.g. the federalist and neo-functionalist approaches number 4 deserves a few words. According to Deutsch a common generalized loyalty can be measured by (1968/193):

“[...] the frequency and saliency of perceptions of joint interests, both in terms of distributions of attention and of parallel expectations of reward, as shown by survey data and by the content analysis of mass media and government communications. Another indication would be the objective compatibility or consonance of the major values of the participating populations, permitting cooperation among them to be perceived as legitimate. This could be supplemented by indications of common subjective feelings of the legitimacy of the integrated community, making loyalty to it also a matter of internalized psychic compulsion.”

Deutsch attaches importance to factors which belong to cultural aspects, according to my previous (short) conceptualisation. This becomes evident, when he goes on to define ‘identification’ as the (1968/193): “[...] the deliberate promotion of processes and sentiments of mutual identification, loyalties, and “we”-feelings.” The cultural variable’s importance becomes even clearer, when Deutsch discusses the ‘Essential background conditions’ for an amalgamated security community.

In their 1957 book, Deutsch et al. analyses ‘security communities’ to see how zones of peace may develop. Their empirical material builds on about 36 historic case studies. They understand integration and ‘amalgamation’ as different but partly overlapping. They defined integration as (1957/5): “[...] the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population”. And (1957/6) “By amalgamation we mean the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal.”

The interesting unit in our case is the amalgamated security community (ASC), as it is the most ambitious project, which may take on state form as a result of integration; whereas the ‘pluralist security community’ at the most is comparable to a confederation. On the basis of their case studies Deutsch et al. identifies five ‘essential requirements’ for the establishment of ASCs (1957/46-69):

“1. *Values and Expectations*. [...] in regard to values, we found in all our cases a compatibility of the main values held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units. Sometimes this was supplemented by a tacit agreement to deprive of political significance any incompatible values that might remain. [...] Values were most effective politically when they were not held merely in abstract terms, but when they were incorporated in political institutions and in habits of political behaviour which permitted these values to be acted on in such a way as to strengthen people’s attachment to them. This connection [...] we call a “way of life”, and it turned out to be crucial”. [...] In regard to expectations, we found that in all our cases amalgamation was preceded by widespread expectations of joint rewards for the participating units, through strong economic ties or gains envisaged for the future” [...].

2. *Capabilities and Communication Processes*. [...] The most important of these conditions was an increase in the political and administrative capabilities of the main political units to be amalgamated. [...] Another essential condition for amalgamation, closely related to the increase in capabilities, is the presence of markedly superior economic growth, [...]. Another essential requirement for successful amalgamation was the presence of unbroken links of social communication between the political units concerned, and between the politically relevant strata within them. [...]

3. *Mobility of persons*. Another condition present in all our cases of successful amalgamation was the mobility of persons among the main units, at least in the politically relevant strata. [...].

4. *Multiplicity and Balance of Transactions*. [...] it appeared that successfully amalgamated security-communities require a fairly wide range of different common functions and services, together with different institutions and organizations to carry them out. [...]

5. *Mutual Predictability of Behaviour*. A final condition that may be essential for the success of amalgamation may be some minimum amount of mutual predictability of behaviour. [...], we found in a number of our cases that mutual predictability of behaviour was eventually established upon a firm basis. This firm basis was the acquisition of a certain amount of common culture or of common group character or “national character”.

Not surprisingly Deutsch et al also identified a number of factors which would either prevent or slowdown the integration respective amalgamation process, or break up an ASC (1957/59-65):

1. Extensive military burdens have had a disintegrating effect.
2. The participation of large amounts of citizens, which had not previously participated in politics, has strained the political system, especially if their participation has increased ethnic or linguistic differentiation.

3. Economic decline, over a longer period, has tended to weaken the capability of the government and the political elite.
4. The political elites would have to be open to new members, and to be able to adjust to new circumstances, otherwise a counter-elite would be formed eventually with disintegration as the result.
5. Unfulfilled expectations in social, economic, or political reforms could also lead to disintegration.

To Deutsch (1968/198-99) the integration process begins when three situations occur and old habits are broken:

1. Expectations of a new, common and better life must be present; expectations which create some kind of, latent, feeling of unity.
2. The feeling of unity will be created by an external challenge which demands a united response
3. A new generation of politicians has to arrive on the political scene, as younger people are less bound by past experiences and habits.

Deutsch et al. wrote in a time, where, according to Huntington (2000/ xiii) culture was accepted in political science as a “crucial element in understanding societies, analyzing differences among them, and explaining their economic and political development”. Thus Deutsch’s emphasise on institutions and culture is in no way ‘suspect’, it lays in the then present tradition. But this element has been played down in most, if not all the following classical works on integration. Relating Deutsch et al’s work with the short discussion of ‘culture’ above is one of the aims of this essay.

What makes Deutsch et al’s contribution so valuable is its broad empirical basis, but that it also its weakness, as some of the cases are very old and hardly helps us today (e.g. the uniting of Wales and England and the gathering of the Habsburg Empire with violence). Also the emphasise on the breaking of habits especially the expectation of a new and better life, united, is questionable – and as Deutsch generalizes the statement somewhat in the 1968 book compared to his 1957 book, he may have been aware of this. Only in an abstract way did the population of the 13 American colonies find a new “distinct way of life” (1957/85) from the beginning. But they did break political habits in so far as they seized self-determination, taking responsibility of their own lives. In this sense it is reasonable. To Deutsch culture played an important role.

Culture is diffuse and hard to come to grips with, as described in section two. We know that ‘culture’ was an acceptable variable to include in ones analysis at the time Haas, Riker, Whearer and Deutsch wrote their contributions to integration-theory yet only Deutsch specifically treated the issue, and Wheare

was unclear about it, but did admit its importance. Riker did not mention it at all, although he and Haas (and to a lesser degree Schmitter) included cultural elements in their work. One reason that Riker and Haas did not mention 'culture' as an important variable, could be that their cases (Riker's federations and Haas' ECSC) were basically culturally homogenous, and thus this variable was not important. In their joint work from 1964 Haas and Schmitter included cultural variables although not in a systematic way.

### **Culture and Regional Integration**

If culture is hard to come to grips with, as described in section two, perhaps that is one explanation why culture as independent variable has only been included unsystematically in some of the theoretical approaches to regional integration theory; the expectation being transaction analysis. But today realists like Samuel Huntington are beginning to consider culture an important variable, and so do the 'liberals', when discussing the importance of 'norms and rules' in relation to institutions. The (counter-) argument, that e.g. European integration is based on adherence to rules, democratic principles and a common understanding of human rights is no genuine argument for leaving culture or religion out of the analysis, as these two constitute the fundament upon which the former are based. Thus there seem to be reason for looking further at the importance of culture in relation to regional integration.

A tentative working hypothesis could be that some kind of cultural homogeneity is an important precondition for supranational integration<sup>13</sup>. The argument would be, that engaging in close cooperation both at the governmental level and among citizens, NGOs and companies are facilitated if one shares a common understanding of what is right and what is wrong and 'how things are done' in other words, the same basic or core culture (But one has to remember, that culture is not static but it develops – slowly). This implies that manifest cultures of two cultures which were once overlapping may once develop in opposite directions.

When looking at the relationship culture – regional integration on the background of the previous sections (and here only looking at culture, leaving aside other important variables) I expect the following five working hypothesis:

- a durable integration, with the highest aspirations (e.g. state formation) should share a common core culture as well as manifest culture to be successful (H.1)

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<sup>13</sup> It would blow the frame of this essay, but a comparison of the above approaches to integration begs for several other aspects to be analysed empirically: the importance of crisis, of a secretariat general, of economic gains, of interdependence / globalisation ...

- Integration projects sharing core cultures, but not manifest cultures are ‘crisis prone’ but they will be able to develop common manifest cultures, and thus turn more stabile (H. 2)<sup>14</sup>.
- An integration project only sharing common manifest culture is prone to get into crisis, as (manifest) culture develop and no common core culture is present. (H. 3)
- Integration projects where the constituting units do not share a common core culture or a common manifest culture are also prone to fall apart. One way to solve the problems of the categories 2 and 3 is, of course, to construct a federation, but again a federation is most likely to succeed for the cases where the units share a common core culture. (H. 4).
- As an additional hypothesis one could add, that lesser ambitious projects may work out, as long as the participants share features of the manifest culture. (H. 5)

	<b>Sharing core culture</b>	<b>Not sharing core culture</b>
<b>Sharing manifest culture</b>	H.1 Germany	H.3 South Africa
<b>Not sharing manifest culture</b>	H.2 United Arab Republic (1958-1961)	H.4 Soviet Union (1919-1991)

Tab. 1: Relationship culture – regional integration ‘the strait cases’

Naturally a serious empirical survey is necessary, but that is unfortunately not possible in this working paper. But a list of integration projects *chosen at random* (appendix A) lends some plausibility to the working hypothesis. The list is grouped in the four mentioned categories. The list indicates:

(a) That a shared common core and manifest cultures is an advantage when one would like to integrate (German Federation, Brazilian Federation, Argentine Federation), but also that a common core and manifest culture do not provide a guarantee for integration to happen (e.g. the Nordic countries are absent as a ‘state’). Additionally considering core and manifest cultures do not prevent a crisis not to happen (the troublemakers of the EU at the time of writing are Britain, Poland and the Czech Republic, all sharing common core and manifest culture). (b) In the same vein shared core and manifest cultures are no guarantee

<sup>14</sup> Establishing a federation is one way of solving divergences in the manifest culture (e.g. Switzerland).

to for states to keep united (Czechoslovakia, Denmark-Iceland, Sweden-Norway).

(c) Projects with matching core cultures but diverging manifest cultures may very well keep together (Belgium, Canada, Switzerland), although ‘obvious matches’ like the West Indian Federation or the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland show the difficulties statesmen have to face, and the United Arab Republic did not last long either.

(d) The category I expected to be very crisis prone, the one with shared manifest culture but no core culture, boasts a number of federations, and they are doing well in spite of religious and racial tensions (e.g. South Africa, Nigeria), thus indicating that a ‘marriage of convenience’ may be very solid. It is of course worth while remembering that these two states are federal systems.

(e) Not surprisingly the fourth category contains states (and ex-states) which try to keep together with military force (e.g. USSR, Russia, and India) and which did not share cultural features. (g) Altogether the list indicates that it is important to look at other variables too. In other words, would one like to make predictions as to the sustainability of regional integration projects, the cultural variable indicates a trend, not a law and cannot stand alone. Still a common core and manifest culture seem to be important for successful, sustainable regional integration; they simplify matters. If one of them isn’t present a number of counter measures should be taken like e.g. establishing a federation rather than a unitary state. On the other hand, a common and manifest culture is no guarantee for successful integration (Czechoslovakia, Denmark-Iceland, Sweden-Norway). Thus culture ought to be a variable in the theories of regional integration. The exact importance of culture as variable needs further empirically based research.

	<b>Sharing core culture</b>	<b>Not sharing core culture</b>
<b>Sharing manifest culture</b>	<p>H.1 Scandinavia (A state did not emerge)</p> <p>Czechoslovakia (Fell apart)</p>	<p>H.3 (United States of America?)</p>
<b>Not sharing manifest culture</b>	<p>H.2 West Indies (The federation fell apart)</p>	<p>H.4 India (The federation survives)</p>

Tab. 2: Relationship culture – regional integration: the ‘odd cases’ remind us to be cautious when applying ‘culture’ as explanation when integration-projects fail or succeed.

How would this ‘demand for inclusion’ of the cultural variable fit regional integration theories? When analysing regional integration, the classical theories of regional integration, federalism, neo-functionalism and transactionalism as a rule had culturally homogeneous regions as their cases. This may, on the one hand, explain why culture (manifest or core) was not a central issue to federalism and neo-functionalism, contrary to transactionalism, which also looked at cases where culture could play a role. When cultural variables were touched upon, it was the manifest elements not core-culture. On the other hand, the neglect of the cultural variable does not mean that it cannot be incorporated into them. It is the claim of this paper, that it would indeed be beneficial.

## Appendix 1

### **A tentative list of ambitious integration-projects:**

#### *Matching core and manifest cultures:*

Argentina  
Australia  
Austria  
Brazil  
Czechoslovakia (1918-2002)  
Comoros  
Denmark-Iceland (fifteenth century – 1943)  
Ethiopia  
Germany  
Mexico  
Micronesia  
Pakistan  
St. Kitts and Nevis  
Sweden-Norway (1814-1905)  
United Arab Emirates

#### *Matching core cultures, diverging manifest cultures:*

Belgium  
Canada  
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1958-1963)  
Switzerland  
United Arab Republic (1958-1961)  
United States of America (perhaps)  
West Indian Federation (1958-1962)

#### *Matching manifest cultures, diverging core cultures:*

Bosnia-Herzegovina  
European Union after the last enlargement  
Malaysia  
Nigeria  
South Africa  
Venezuela (?)

#### *No matching core and manifest cultures:*

India (e.g. Punjab)  
Russia (e.g. Tjetenia)  
Soviet Union (1919-1991)  
Yugoslavia (1918-2001)



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